

Fraternity

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THE existence of a common bond is an essential characteristic of fraternal relations. It is a necessary condition of fraternity that the parties to the relation share something. The sense of bond that is a defining feature of fraternity does not lie in the sharing of goods by agents. If we share a hammer, a road, an office, a house, a market, a postman, a view of a lake, there is some common good that we each use, but *we* need not thereby have anything in common. Though we would be using the same good, our desires, interests, sentiments, and aims may be completely distinct and mutually independent. In these cases, the relation is essentially between an agent and a good, and it is only incidentally that other agents bear the same relation to the good. The bond constitutive of fraternity must involve a share in features that are intrinsic to the agents themselves.

What, then, must be shared by men in order that fraternity can exist among them? Before addressing this question, it is perhaps helpful to make two preliminary points. First, in just raising this question, I am rejecting one sort of account of the sense of bond that is a necessary condition of fraternity. This is the position in respect to fraternity that may be called sentimentalism which consists in the view that fraternity and perhaps also the affective and practical attitudes proceeding from it are primitive in the sense that they cannot be explained or justified by appeal to any further considerations.¹ Second, for the most part, I leave aside the usual basis for a sense of fraternal bond: that having to do with natural kinship by virtue of identical parentage. The excuse for this omission is that my primary focus is on the public ideal of fraternity. And for this, it appears that what we have in common in having the same earthly or heavenly parent is only marginally helpful: the same earthly parent, though it is a clear enough and easily settled fact, is shared by too few; the same

¹ The sentimental view itself may of course be defended, say, by appeal to the doctrines of epistemological intuitionism.

heavenly parent, though it would be shared by many or all, is a rather obscure and sharply disputed fact.² I shall later consider other reasons for resisting a hasty assimilation of civic fraternity to familial bonds.

With these restrictions in mind, let us return to the question: What is the nature of a common bond? To arrive at an answer to this question, it may be useful to look at examples of individuals joined together in a bond. At least in the early stages, a child and his parents are sometimes bound by intense ties of love and trust. The parents' care for the child is a spontaneous expression of the joy and affection that they feel in his presence and thriving. An infant's bond with his parents is accounted for by the fact that his well-being is intimately bound up with the well-being of his parents, and that he recognizes their regard for his well-being. A different sort of relationship in which there is a common bond is one in which individuals are wholeheartedly committed to a cause—say, the cause of abolishing hunger from their community. If the cause is a central project in the lives of all, and if they are able to work harmoniously in pursuit of their cause, and if they mutually recognize their calling, they would develop strong bonds of loyalty and affection.

The individuals in these two relationships have quite special characteristic motives. The motivation of individuals for entering and sustaining their ties in relationships of a common bond differs from the motivation of the individuals in the earlier examples who make use of the same goods. Unlike men who deploy the same means, those who share a bond do not initiate or maintain their ties out of self-interested motives. A parent's care and concern for a child may require the sacrifice of much or all that is to the sole advantage of the parent. A man's motive for striving after a goal may not involve thoughts about what is expedient; advancement of a cause often demands acting in ways that go against one's self-interest. Moreover, those in ties of a common bond, though they may not do what is unfair or wrong, need not be acting out of considerations of what in general would be fair or good. A parent's care for his offspring would not decrease upon learning that either fairness would be better served or more good produced by attending to the children of others, or to the lives of altogether different people. Those person-

² For suggestive remarks on the notion of a heavenly parent see Bernard Williams, *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 77–78.

ally absorbed in the cause of abolishing hunger in their community are not likely to withdraw from their engagement on being persuaded that it would be fairer or more felicitous to eliminate hunger elsewhere, or to fight a still different social ill. Thus, we can say that the basic reason for the actions and attitudes of the individuals in our two examples of a common bond is their spontaneously felt desire for the ends they espouse.

Now it is sometimes supposed that behavior issuing directly from spontaneously felt desires (unlike, say, conduct done of duty or prudence) cannot, without strain, be thought of as action that admits of appraisal. If our characterization of the individuals joined by a sense of bond is roughly correct, this supposition cannot be right. Indeed, it is hard to see how else their conduct can be accurately described. Besides, it is a familiar fact of life that parents can reproach themselves and be reproached by their children on the ground that parental care and concern is not a spontaneous expression of the parents' feelings. Similarly, a man can criticize himself and be criticized for a failure to be fully and spontaneously absorbed in the pursuit of an end that he has adopted. If these acts of reproach and self-reproach are not always absurd, as I take it they are not, a man's conduct can sometimes be an expression of his spontaneous desires. And the conduct of persons tied together by a sense of bond is prompted by such motives.

Ties of a common bond further differ from relationships in which individuals put the same goods to use in that in that the former, but not in the latter, individuals must share certain ends. Men who are after the same goods may not have any aims or affections in common: their conceptions of the good can differ or clash. Even if such men enter into cooperation, say, because the goods in question are scarce, they need not see one another as anything more than means that can ease or obstruct each person's access to the scarce goods that he needs to further his independent ends. And if the cooperative arrangements are governed by considerations of fairness or respect, each person would try to maximize the means to his own aims under the constraint of not encroaching on the aims of others. As Kant points out: ". . . by the principle of *respect* which they owe one another they are directed to keep themselves at a distance."³ Yet to act as the principle of respect directs is not to embrace the aims of

³ Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis, New York: Liberal Arts, 1964), p. 113.

others. What is absent in situations in which individuals utilize the same goods (even where the employment of goods is regulated by principles of respect or fair play) and what is conspicuously present in relationships in which individuals are joined by a bond is a shared end.

What is the nature of the shared end that is constitutive of a common bond? First, in a loving relationship between parent and child, for example, each identifies with the other. Among persons dedicated to the end of abolishing hunger in their community, there is by each direct self-identification with the project, and indirect identification with the others in virtue of their shared commitment.⁴ Second, in relationships of a common bond, the end is shared in being, in some measure, indivisible. Indivisible ends differ from indivisible goods in that it is not necessary that indivisible goods are desired or sought by their beneficiaries. If the state in which I reside provides the indivisible good of national security, it is possible that I do not want this good and may oppose measures for its provision. By contrast, it is a necessary condition of a good which is an indivisible end that it is a man's actual object of pursuit even if it turns out that its attainment does not bring him any benefits. Comparatively pure instances of indivisible ends are easily located in the well-defined setting of games. Paton offers the example of football in which "we obviously cooperate with our side and share a common desire, the desire that our side should win."⁵ Victory in football is an indivisible end: it can be gained only by all or none in the team. In the relationship between parent and child, the fate of each is tied to the fate of the other. The good or ill-fate of one is, in some measure, the good or ill-fate of both. Similarly, the triumph or defeat of a cause is a major achievement or failure in the lives of all who have given themselves fully to the cause. Finally, that individuals tied in a common bond have indi-

⁴ Identification is taken up in a number of Freud's writings. For a discussion that includes an analysis of the role of identification in wider associations outside the family see: "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), vol. 18, chap. 7. An illuminating essay on identification and Freud's views of it is Richard Wollheim, "Identification and Imagination: The Inner Structure of a Psychic Mechanism," *Freud*, ed. Richard Wollheim (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1974), pp. 172–95. See also Richard Wollheim, "The Good Self and the Bad Self: The Moral Psychology of British Idealism and the English School of Psychoanalysis Compared," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 61 (1976): 373–98.

⁵ H.J. Paton, *The Good Will* (London: Macmillan, 1927), p. 241.

visible ends with which they identify themselves is not merely an external fact about such relationships. The participants themselves mutually recognize that they have shared ends directly in one another or indirectly through a commitment to a common aim. Accordingly, relationships of a common bond are always, to an extent, unions of shared sentiments.

Some light may be thrown on the conditions of a common bond just outlined if we turn briefly to a few emotions that individuals with a sense of bond are prone to feel. Pride is the good feeling that we have in the belief that we have accomplished something worthwhile; and shame is the ill-feeling we experience in seeing ourselves fail before our own ideals. Now men take pride in the good deeds of others with whom they are joined in a common bond; and they are ashamed by their unworthy conduct. Parents commonly feel pride and shame in their children's attributes. Men committed to a cause feel likewise in the acts of those who share their commitment. The fact that these characteristically self-regarding emotions are here elicited by the conduct of others is easily explained once we notice that where a sense of bond exists the individual sees himself in another self. Special emotions attend the loss of an end—a person or a cause—that is a basis of a sense of bond. The experience of loss in ties of a common bond does not merely result in the frustration that is felt in being deprived of an object of satisfaction. Nor is the feeling limited to the resentment or indignation that is occasioned by the loss of a right. Beyond these and other ill-feelings which may be caused by the loss of an end that constitutes a sense of bond, the loss here arouses feelings that are not characteristically induced by the loss of most goods: men mourn over the loss of the shared ends that establish their bonds. According to Freud: "Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on."⁶ That a man normally mourns over the loss of a child, an ideal, a cause, or a fellow champion of a cause indicates that the objects to which we are attached by a sense of bond absorb the whole self.

It is important to note that common bonds are not everywhere the same. There are indeed significant differences between the two types of relationships—roughly illustrated by our two examples—in

⁶ Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 14, p. 243.

which individuals have a common bond. To bring out some of these points of dissimilarity in relief, it is worth noticing three features of the bond between parent and child. First, the fact that the child's fate is bound up with that of his parents is not an outcome of the child's choice. That the child has to tend to his own well-being, and that his well-being is directly affected by the well-being of his parents is, one might say, a natural fact. Similarly, it is largely a dictate of natural contingencies that the parents nurture this particular infant. Second, the bond between parent and child as well as the shared destiny from which it originates holds between specific, assignable individuals. The identities of the parties to the relation is naturally fixed. Third, owing to the first two features, mutual recognition of the shared fate of parent and child is easily forthcoming. The child has a natural motivation to cater to his own well-being. A natural extension of the child's motive to promote his own well-being would account for the child's recognition of those who care for him. As Rawls puts it, the child's love for his parents and his recognition of their love "does not—indeed, cannot—have a rational explanation in terms of his antecedent instincts and desires."⁷ And since the persons who directly and spontaneously look after the child's well-being are specific, assignable individuals, there is an additional reason for thinking that the conditions for reciprocal recognition of a shared destiny can be easily fulfilled in the parental relationship.

The bond among the individuals engaged in the relief of hunger is markedly different. First, the end to which they have given themselves may be one that they have chosen to adopt. What binds them together may have little to do with their individual or collective well-being. Second, the bond arising from the project of alleviating hunger is not confined to assignable persons. Any group of men resolved to join together in a fight against hunger can develop this sort of bond. Third, mutual recognition of their shared fate is not readily secured as in the parental bond. In the case of a dedication to the cause of doing away with hunger, due to the fact that the shared aim is not naturally given, and the indeterminacy of the identities of the agents who have chosen the project, mutual recognition can be hard to establish. Whether other persons are tied to one's fate, and who they are may be difficult to discern. Even if others are earnestly en-

⁷ John Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," *Moral Concepts*, ed. Joel Feinberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 125.

gaged with us in the agreed upon tasks of bringing aid to the hungry, we want to be assured that their conduct is not inspired by ulterior purposes such as rising to a high post in Oxfam or winning the Nobel Prize.

The threefold difference between the two kinds of bonds among individuals mutually acknowledging the shared aims that they spontaneously embrace can be seen as aspects of a deeper divide between natural and free unions. In the bond between parent and child, the shared fate, the identities of the parties striving for common aims, their mutual love all lie importantly beyond the reach of choice. In the bond among devotees to a cause, the end to which they have committed themselves, the identities of the members, mutual recognition of their common cause are all, to some degree, matters open to choice.

In the light of this discrepancy between domestic and public bonds, it should be easier to understand why natural bonds are not best suited to serve as a model for civic fraternity. All the distinctive features of domestic bonds impose restrictions on the scope of this form of union. In the associations of civic life, our well-being is not naturally bound up with the well-being of assignable persons. In these wider unions, it is unlikely that individuals, in the natural course of their lives, would arrive at a mutual recognition of the concord in their desires, attitudes, ends, and sentiments. It is indeed striking that social and political associations in which these conditions prevail—say, forms of slavery and feudalism—public life retains the natural traces of domesticity.

But if domestic bonds cannot be plausibly extended to the wider spheres of civil society and the state, it might be concluded that fraternity is an improper way to conceive of the bonds of civic life for, after all, fraternity, too, is a familial tie. Although fraternity is a familial bond, it is, I think, the least domestic of the bonds possible in the family. The relationship between siblings differs from the parental tie for between siblings a common bond may not develop at all. And if a common bond does obtain, it may not be fraternal. For example, as Aristotle points out: “if brothers differ *much* in age, the friendship is no longer of the fraternal type.”⁸ So, a fraternal relationship is not always, from the start, a natural bond of dependency and affection. Underscoring the comparative freedom of fraternal relations, Aristotle says: “The friendship of brothers is like that of

⁸ Aristotle, *Ethics*, 1161a.

comrades.”⁹ Thus, following Aristotle, we can say that fraternal bonds, unlike other familial bonds, arise from shared ends that are pursued by individuals who freely recognize their union. The proposal to view the bonds of wider associations under the aspect of fraternity stems therefore from the consideration that fraternity is a familial tie that can exist free of the natural fetters of domesticity.

II

Many who would agree with the foregoing characterization of fraternity would nevertheless reject the suggestion that fraternity is a civic virtue. The civic ideal of fraternity is often summarily dismissed as utopian either in the backward-looking sense of a regression to simpler stages of social life or in the forward-looking sense of a yearning for forms of social life that are stripped of the recalcitrant complexities of society. At any rate, the received view is that fraternity cannot be realized under modern social circumstances. So, though it may be conceded that the ideal of fraternity points to a distinctive, perhaps even attractive, vision of social life, it is denied that the form of social life envisioned is a live alternative for us. To think otherwise is deemed misguided, or, worse, pernicious. We are therefore advised to cultivate fraternity just in our personal relations.¹⁰ I believe that the contention that fraternity cannot be a modern civic virtue is mistaken. To show that this thesis concerning fraternity is erroneous, I do not propose to challenge it directly or to rebut the arguments urged in its favor; instead, I shall identify a modern civic idea of far-reaching importance that is a clear exemplar, or so I shall argue, of the bond of fraternity—nationalism.

Nationalism has received less philosophical examination than it warrants partly because of the admittedly notorious difficulty of iden-

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” *From Max Weber*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 128. A masterly literary treatment of fraternity in personal relations is Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park*. This aspect of the novel is interestingly discussed in Gilbert Ryle, “Jane Austen and the Moralists,” *Oxford Review* 1 (February 1966): 5–18. The dissenting view that fraternity has a place in civic life is voiced in Isaiah Berlin “Two Concepts of Liberty,” *Four Essays on Liberty* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 154–62; J.N. Findlay, *Values and Intentions* (London, New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 327–31.

tifying and defining nations and nationalities.¹¹ But, I think, just as it is possible to speak about the nature of familial bonds without the benefit of a definition of the family, nationalism can be discussed without reliance on more than an intuitive notion of nationhood. For present purposes, it would suffice to say that a people constitutes a nation if the bulk of the population possesses a lively sense of a common culture and history. And under certain circumstances, a people that is a nation is aroused by the sentiment of nationalism. I shall not go into the causes of nationalism such as its development as a reaction by a people to a felt injury at the hands of others, or as a social force wielded to cement a loosely integrated population to meet the exigencies of economic and political arrangements, or as an ideology exploited by rising classes to facilitate and legitimate their ascent to state power. Leaving the complex questions of its causes undecided, my chief aim is to determine the psychological state of a people that is in the grips of nationalism.

A nationalist feels strong ties of loyalty and affection to his fellow nationals and his nation's collective symbols and aims. A nationalist cares for the well-being of his fellow nationals. He is driven to act in ways that contribute to his nation's welfare. A nationalist's conduct need not originate in self-interested considerations; nationalists in fact display a preparedness to self-sacrifice that is rarely encountered outside the narrow institutions of family and friendship. Nor is the altruistic conduct of a nationalist undertaken in accordance with impersonal considerations of equity and universal benevolence. A nationalist's devotion to his own people is not easily redirected to other communities or causes even if this change is acknowledged to be a dictate of fairness or benevolence. A nationalist's selfless dedication to the well-being of his nation is a spontaneous expression of the affection and loyalty that he feels for his own people.

¹¹ On the difficulties of identifying and defining the nation see: V.I. Lenin, *On The National Question and Proletarian Internationalism* (Moscow: Norosti Press, 1969); Derek Parfit, "Later Selves and Moral Principles," *Philosophy and Personal Relations*, ed. Alan Montefiore (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1973), pp. 137–69. Interesting discussions of nationalism are found in Isaiah Berlin's essays. See especially "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," *Against the Current*, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Viking, 1980), pp. 333–55. Isaiah Berlin does not discriminate too finely between what belongs to the concept of nationalism and what belongs to its historical fortune. But I do not say this by way of criticism since his essays are intended as exercises in the history of ideas.

Nationalists identify their personal fate with the national fate. A national achievement or defeat is an accomplishment or failure in the life of a nationalist. Persons stirred by nationalism find special satisfaction in the fact that their worthy work comes to be seen as belonging to a nation's legacy. Beyond the usual feelings experienced by men in doing what they deem unworthy, a nationalist feels particular dissatisfaction in the belief that his ill-deeds bring disgrace to his nation. Where the sentiment of nationalism prevails, pride and shame are civic emotions: nationalists take pride in their nation's glory; and they are shamed by the nation's humiliation. Mourning which, as noted above, is our reaction to the loss of an object to which we are attached by love is an emotion to which nationalists can succumb. Nationalists mourn the loss of their nation or objects of national value. The loves of nationalists are indivisible. Maintenance of the nation's identity, triumph over natural and historical adversities, achievements of national culture and the like are collective aims; none can be an object of exclusive individual endeavor.

The motivations of affection and loyalty, the ties of self-identification, the pursuit of indivisible ends, in terms of which we have characterized a nationalist's state of mind, are mutually recognized among fellow nationalists. Nationalism is therefore a union of sentiment. I do not mean to suggest that this bond of sentiment is supervenient upon other forms of union. It is true that a people bound together by nationalism can also belong to the same economic or political associations. Yet nationalism can persist—indeed, intensify—upon the dissolution of political, economic and territorial ties. As Sidgwick points out, a people “if their government were destroyed by war or revolution, they would still tend to hold firmly together.”¹² Nationalism is therefore, in the first place, a union of sentiment.

It should now be reasonably clear that nationalism is a civic exemplar of the bond of fraternity. The conditions of fraternity—reciprocal recognition by the parties of their motives of affection and devotion, their practical and affective relations of identification, their embrace of indivisible aims—are also the conditions of the bond of nationalism. Moreover, our earlier suggestion that fraternity, though it can be a natural bond, is the familial tie that can stand independently of natural ties carries over to the bond of nationalism. Of

¹² Henry Sidgwick, *The Elements of Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1897), p. 224.

course, a people may be a nation on the basis of natural kinship; and nationalism in such a nation is subject to the naturally fixed limits of kinship relations. There is, however, no lack of nationhood among peoples of diverse ancestry; and ardent nationalism can spring in such nations. Indeed, nationalism often breaks apart the barriers separating different clans, tribes, and other natural systems of thought and conduct. Thus, nationalism, though it is sometimes a natural fraternal bond, unlike other social bonds such as clans and tribes, it can stand free of the natural fetters of ethnicity. But it may be objected that even where a sense of nationhood is free of ethnic or kinship ties, national affinity must still have natural roots. What makes a certain people mine is that we have a common history and culture, and the fact that I belong to this or that particular cultural or historical community is a contingency of nature. While this suggestion is right, it is doubtful that it is a compelling ground for denying the possibility of free nationalist bonds. In the narrow bonds of personal love and friendship, our affinity with particular persons often rests on the fact that we happen to have a common history of shared experiences. It is, however, questionable that many would see their affections in these associations as simply dictated by natural contingencies. Since, in this regard, private and public affections are alike, it would be gratuitous to hold that our private affections express our free personality whereas our public affections betray our parochial nature. That our affections extend to persons with whom we share a common history and the like in all bonds—private and public—indicates that it is a deep fact about the affinities of human nature.

Beyond nationalism, civic fraternity can exist among people who bear no natural relations. A man can be possessed by a passionate devotion to a moral or non-moral ideal: liberty, justice, beauty, productive work, adventure, the state, the betterment of the human condition. A man need not be steered to these pursuits by a prior adherence to principles of self-interest or morality. Sometimes an aspiration to an ideal just is the expression of the desire and affection that we feel for the goods that it represents. A man so moved identifies with the ideal to which he gives his life and which, in turn, gives meaning to his living. Such a person would also identify with individuals who share his attachments. And men who mutually recognize their dedication to an ideal as well as the concurrence in their paths to the end with which they identify themselves would develop a fraternal bond. Depending on the nature of the shared ideal and the distri-

bution of the individuals who aspire to it, these forms of civic fraternity can exist in institutions within a nation and in associations that cross national boundaries.

III

Suppose it is allowed that the present characterization of fraternity and the identification of social relations exemplifying civic fraternity is roughly correct, it still remains to be seen if there are claims of morality incumbent on a sense of fraternal bond.

In trying to get a grip on the problem of how practical dictates can emerge in common bonds, there is an approach that I wish to avoid. In the social thought of British Idealism, for instance, there is, to put it crudely, a tendency to regard a human bond as a macro individual of which the members are, in some obscure way, micro parts. This organic conception of human bonds, common in idealist and romantic thought, is clearly enunciated in F. H. Bradley's declaration: "Yes, the state is not put together, but it lives; it is not a heap nor a machine; it is no mere extravagance when a poet talks of a nation's soul."¹³ On this conception of human bonds, the question of what we ought to prize and pursue in virtue of having a sense of bond is interpreted as the problem of what the macro individual prizes and pursues and what we, as functional parts of it, must contribute to its optimal functioning. What is perhaps tempting in this tack is that what at first sight seems an intractable evaluative and normative problem of how a plurality of agents ought to respond and act toward one another now turns out to be the more manageable problem of what is reasonable self-regarding conduct for a single individual; and the shift seems attractive on the familiar, though seldom defended, intuition that what concerns the single individual is easier to explain and justify than what concerns the interaction of individuals. But this general approach seems to be futile for there is no macro individual to whom we can ascribe either the attributes found in each of us or the characteristics we manifest in our interaction. Moreover, the idealist and romantic way of construing communitarian ties capri-

¹³ F.H. Bradley, "My Station and its Duties," *Ethical Studies* (Indianapolis, New York: Liberal Arts, 1951), p. 120.

ciously converts our sense of bond into an incoherent craving for collectivism.

There is an intimate connection between the existence of a sense of fraternal bond with others and the possession of moral attitudes toward them. As noted earlier, a condition of a common bond with a person is to care for his well-being. If a moral regard for persons is a concern in their good for their sake, then those fraternally related necessarily bear moral relations to each other. That moral feelings and acts are constitutive of fraternal bonds can be seen in the fact that a serious lack of concern for the good of others is not merely an unfortunate occurrence in the relationship; it signifies an attenuation of the sense of bond itself. In other communitarian ties, it is evident that altruism is constitutive of a sense of bond. In friendship, for instance, one who ceases to care for the good of his friend is not a friend in poor moral standing: he is hardly a friend. Similarly, in a fraternal bond, a person without any interest in the well-being of those to whom he is fraternally related is a brother only in name. We can therefore say that it is impossible to flout the moral responsibilities of fraternity without forfeiting fraternal bonds.

The moral regard for persons that is constitutive of a fraternal bond has certain distinctive features. The other-regarding attitudes and actions issue from affection and loyalty felt for the other.¹⁴ To the question "Why do you selflessly aim at this man's good?" it is sufficient to say: "He is my brother." That a basic reason for altruistic conduct is given in this reply is shown by the fact that the beneficiary is not likely to assign greater worth to his brother's action if it should turn out that the more fundamental reason for the action is some impersonal consideration of morality even if it happens that, by the light of impersonal principles, there is some ancillary reason to show special attention to the well-being of one's brother. Thus, we noted that parents may reproach themselves and be reproached by their chil-

¹⁴ Noting that a concern for another person's good may be a manifestation of our personal affection and loyalty may shed light on forms of motivation sometimes invoked in moral philosophy that, at first blush, have an air of paradox: for example, Broad's characterization of the altruism of common sense as self-referential altruism or Rawls's conception of persons at the original position as stretching through two generations through sentiments of goodwill. See C.D. Broad, *Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy*, ed. David R. Cheney (London: Humanities Press, 1971), p. xii; Rawls, pp. 128, 140.

dren if the parental concern shown is not an expression of the love felt for the child. The fact that we can be deeply hurt if the altruism we receive in a bond issues from motives other than affection and loyalty, even if these other sources are moral, demonstrates that a sense of bond is a basis for a distinct form of moral regard.

The moral regard that is appropriate in a bond may not be accorded with ease to non-humans. It is impossible for us to establish mutually recognized ties of affection and identification with most non-human creatures. Accordingly, moral attitudes that we possess by virtue of a sense of bond cannot be conveyed far beyond the human community. So, suppose we can rescue only one of the following: a species of local worms about whom we know just that they are highly sensitive to pain and that they reside nowhere else, or a group of Martians of whom we know only their unusual adeptness at intellectual exercises, or a group of perfectly ordinary people about whom we know nothing save their distress, we have one reason for giving priority to the course of coming to the rescue of the ordinary humans. For it is only with the humans that it is possible for us to establish a sense of bond, and to acquire the attitudes of mutual care and concern constitutive of a sense of bond.

A general statement of what is morally fitting conduct in a fraternal bond is found in the Christian injunction "Treat thy neighbor lovingly, for he is like yourself" which is the ancestor of the more stringent commandment: "Love thy neighbor as thyself."¹⁵ The altruism called for in this Christian teaching is specifically affectionate and caring conduct. Loving treatment is not to be conferred on just any man. Rather, the phrase "your neighbor" connotes (especially in times when the neighborhood was a more communal association) that we are to treat lovingly those with whom we share a sense of bond. It is also worth emphasizing that morally becoming conduct in a fraternal bond is not to love but to treat lovingly. First, for reasons touched upon in our discussion of natural bonds, people find it impossible to love many as they love themselves or the few close to them. Thus, the morality of fraternity is free of the implausibility of moral

¹⁵ Edward Ullendorff, "Thought Categories in the Hebrew Bible," *Studies in Rationalism, Judaism, and Universalism in Memory of Leon Roth*, ed. Raphael Loewe (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1966), pp. 276–78; D.D. Raphael, "The Standard of Morals," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 75 (1974–75), p. 6; J.L. Mackie, *Ethics* (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 243n.

doctrines prescribing universal benevolence, which presupposes an attitude of unbounded altruism that, in turn, can only spring from what is unavailable—a natural bond binding all mankind. Second, the basis for love may differ from that of loving conduct. Sexual love in many of its significant dimensions—say, its characteristic passions—is a natural bond and so suffers from the limits checking affinities that are importantly unfree. Other forms of personal love are quite eccentric. We may love a person for a certain feature and nevertheless feel indifference for another who has the same feature.¹⁶ It is, of course, important not to exaggerate the idiosyncrasy of personal love by recalling Bradley's observation that we take pleasure "in any one who in some way resembles those we love."¹⁷ Still, since it is the quality as found in this particular individual that is the object of domestic love, the practical attitudes springing from it would have a correspondingly narrow range. Loving conduct, by contrast, is not so restricted in its reach because its object is not the determinate trait in the beloved (one that the lover may lack), but rather the shared quality in each with whom we feel a sense of bond. Hence Kant who generally tends to look down on our affections and affective ties because he thought them too fickle to serve as a secure foundation on which to rest moral requirements, nonetheless, speaks favorably of our moral regard for our neighbor which he characterizes as "practical, not pathological love."¹⁸

The loving treatment befitting fraternal bonds, unlike the conduct required by the injunction "Love thy neighbor as thyself," does not demand equality of care. In this respect, the morality of fraternity also differs from other egalitarian moralities. This aspect of fraternal morality, apart from the already noted advantage of harmonizing with general human inclinations, accords well with our explanation of fraternity. Facts about men's shared attributes are obviously germane to claims of equality.¹⁹ There is, however, an in-

¹⁶ On this and other features of personal friendship and love, I have benefited from the discussions in Gabriele Taylor, "Love," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 76 (1975–76): 147–64; Elizabeth Telfer, "Friendship," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* 71 (1970–71): 223–41.

¹⁷ Cited in Richard Wollheim, *F.H. Bradley* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1959), p. 271.

¹⁸ Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, New York: Liberal Arts, 1959), p. 16.

¹⁹ For an excellent discussion of equality see Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*, Second Series, ed. Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), chap. 6.

interesting contrast in the relation between such facts and the claim to equality on the one hand, and the claim to fraternity on the other. For shared traits to lend cogent support to a claim of human equality, it is essential that the traits in question are present in all to an equal degree. Consequently, the naturally favored strategy in arguments for equality is to rest the case on a few shared human traits in the possession of which there are, in fact, negligible differences in kind and amount from one man to another or, still better, on a trait which does not admit of qualitative or quantitative differences at all. Accordingly, the regularly recommended candidates are attributes such as the capacity of men to occupy an internal perspective over their own lives, or more effectively, if more mysteriously, a transcendental trait of men such as their dignified noumenal status. Whatever the merits of these moves, the motivation to make them is lacking in connection with fraternity. In order that what is shared in the way of desires, affections and aims can foster a sense of bond, it need not be equal. Though it may be credibly maintained that in the bonds of personal love and friendship the parties must share something, it would be excessive to require that what is in common and mutually cherished be possessed and valued equally. In some close bonds such as the parental tie that are evidently relations of dependency, the requirement of equality would be absurd. Similarly, the relations of mutual identification that are essential to the existence of bonds do not entail equality in shared attributes or aims. And if identification with another is, to a degree, a matter of idealization as it is in a child's respect and admiration for a parent, it follows that the bond is between unequals. A parent's identification with a child, though it may not involve idealization of the child, stems partly from a feeling for the child's near total dependency on the parent. Equality does not necessarily figure in civic fraternity either. The mutual affections and identification of nationalism do not require that we regard our fellow nationals as equals in any important respect; it is striking that nationalism binds men otherwise divided by inequalities of rights, powers, and socially valued talents.

The quality and extent of the loving treatment that we give to a person depends on the nature and strength of our sense of bond with that person. Other things equal, the wider the aims that we share with a person and the higher the importance of the place they occupy in our lives, the greater our loving concern for each other. The more intense and complete our identification with a person, the greater the

likelihood that our appreciation of his desires and aims would display deeper sensitivity to his thoughts and feelings about them, and that our effort to promote his good would be more unreserved. And if the good which enlists our mutual devotion lies outside ourselves, our concern for each other is a function of the level of importance that we attach to the good, the extent to which it is an indivisible aim, and the degree of agreement in our conception of the good and its proper pursuit. Thus, nationalists show greatest concern for what they mutually recognize to be the highest symbols of the nation. Their most loving treatment goes to fellow nationalists whose vision of the nation, and whose zealous pursuit of national aims most resembles their own. Those who freely answer the call of a charismatic, national leader show selfless regard toward their leader and their fellow disciples. Looked at in isolation from their social setting, some of these acts may appear supererogatory; but conduct that is beyond the demands of impersonal principles may fall within the mutual expectations of the parties to a bond. Thus Hegel writes:

Patriotism is often understood to mean only a readiness for exceptional sacrifices and actions. Essentially, however, it is the sentiment which, in the relationships of daily life and under ordinary conditions, habitually recognizes that the community is one's substantive ground-work and end.²⁰

Similar altruism, on a lesser scale, is evinced in the smaller associations of civic fraternity. If, for example, a group of workers foregoes a raise in pay for the sake of preventing co-workers from losing their jobs, it does not appear either that this gesture is demanded by principles of fairness, equality, or liberty or that it can always be backed up by considerations of self- or group-interest. The altruism of the workers is intelligible, however, if it is seen as a regard for the aspiration to productive work of their fellow workers, and a concern for their well-being though this, too, cannot be explained away as an impersonal worry over average or aggregate well-being.

Civic fraternity therefore allows us to give wide expression to a distinct form of moral sensibility that is witnessed in the intimate domain of family and friendship. In fraternal bonds we show singular concern for the good of others for their own sake out of abiding affections and loyalties that may surpass the regard demanded by impersonal principles, and that may sharply conflict with our own interests

²⁰ G.W. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: University Press, 1967) #268.

as well as our transient feelings and inclinations. Yet the morality of fraternity faithfully captures subtle differences in levels of moral relations and corresponding discriminations in our moral actions, attitudes and responses to others. Fraternity represents the diverse ways in which individuals are freely drawn together by their common humanity.²¹

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²¹ In writing this essay, I am indebted (through their writings) to Philippa Foot, John Rawls, and Bernard Williams. I have also benefited from conversations with David Hills on the issues touched upon in this paper. This is a descendent of an essay presented to the Faculty Legal Theory Workshop at Yale Law School in February 1980. I am grateful to the participants for drawing my attention to the popular hostility to communitarian ideals like fraternity. In the earlier version I had something to say on the good of the virtue of fraternity; I hope to take up the question of the importance of the social virtues in another essay. I discuss the nature and value of the other virtues in "Character, Virtue, and Freedom," *Philosophy* (forthcoming).